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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As we know from history and the study of law, what looks like legal progress on 
the surface does not necessarily translate into meaningful social change.  Cultural 
norms are “sticky” and not easily discarded.  And yet, neither are they set in stone.  
As Martha Nussbaum has observed, “[P]eople are not stamped out like coins by the 
power machine of social convention.  They are constrained by social norms, but 
norms are plural and people are devious.”1  In the process of navigating the thicket of 
social norms, law plays a role in helping to create or suppress opportunities for 
resisting cultural norms, reinforcing certain norms while contesting others.   
In the past three-and-a-half decades, Title IX has achieved remarkable success in 
encouraging and facilitating creative opportunities for resisting traditional gender 
norms that constrain female athleticism.  This success is due in part to Title IX’s 
creativity in navigating two of the dilemmas that plague feminist strategies for 
gender equality: the double-bind and the backlash.  Title IX has avoided the 
straitjacket of unifying theory and has taken a more pluralistic and pragmatic 
approach than most sex discrimination laws.   
The exercise of trying to pin down Title IX’s underlying theory brings to mind 
the well-known parable about the blind men and the elephant.  Six blind men grab a 
different part of the elephant and each confidently pronounces the nature of the 
beast.  The first man touches the elephant’s side and proclaims it a wall; the second 
man touches the tusk and calls it a spear; the third feels the trunk and announces the 
animal is a snake; the fourth man reaches for the knee and calls it a tree trunk; the 
fifth touches the ear and thinks it a fan; and the sixth finds the tail and describes it as 
                                                                
*Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  An earlier version of this 
paper was presented at the conference, “Girls and Women Rock: Celebrating 35 Years of 
Sport & Title IX,” held in Cleveland, Ohio, March 28-31, 2007.  I am grateful to Ellen 
Staurowsky for the opportunity to present this paper at the conference, and to Kimberly 
Yuracko for her thoughtful remarks as a commentator on the panel.  Many thanks also to 
Catharine Wells for reading and commenting on an earlier draft.  Finally, this article benefited 
greatly from the research assistance of Christopher Helms. 
1MARTHA NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 14 (1999). 
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a rope.  The parable ends with the summary, “each was partly in the right – and all 
were in the wrong.”2   
In similar fashion, Title IX might be described as an example of liberal feminism, 
special treatment, structuralism, dominance feminism and different voice feminism.3  
It is all of the above, depending on where you look.  Like the metaphoric elephant, 
Title IX’s theoretical “nature” defies simple description.  Title IX is a hybrid of 
theory, representing a pragmatic response to the distinctive ways in which women 
encounter subordination in sports.  Although some critics have taken Title IX to task 
for theoretical inconsistency,4 in my view Title IX’s pluralistic approach to theory is 
one of the law’s major strengths.   
This article examines Title IX as an example of a pragmatic approach to theory, 
and argues that pragmatic feminism is an approach that holds promise for feminists 
grappling with the complexity of gender oppression.  Part II briefly examines 
pragmatism as an alternative to foundational theory and considers pragmatism’s 
relationship to feminist legal theory.  Part III explores the many forms and iterations 
of gender subordination in sports.  Calls for a consistent, unifying theory of Title IX 
cannot account for the shifting nature and multiplicity of social and institutional 
practices that subordinate women in sports.  These varied forms of subordination 
necessitate a nimble approach to theory with enough flexibility to tailor the law’s 
response to the discriminatory practice targeted, while not locking in a fixed legal 
approach to other oppressive practices that might be less amenable to the same legal 
treatment.  Part IV turns to the various theoretical frameworks embedded in Title IX 
and briefly examines some of the strengths and limitations in the doctrine they have 
generated.  This article concludes that, by taking a pragmatic theoretical approach, 
Title IX has done a better job than most discrimination laws at navigating the 
double-bind and nudging cultural norms forward to fend off the inevitable backlash.   
II.  PRAGMATISM AND ITS PROMISE FOR FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 
The resurgence of academic interest in pragmatism as a theoretical framework in 
law is largely a response to frustration with, and perhaps fatigue from, the search for 
                                                                
2John Godfrey Saxe, The Blind Man and the Elephant, in POETRY OF AMERICA  150-152 
(George Bell & Sons 1878). 
3See, e.g., Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument 
for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 209, 252-53 (1998) (describing the 
law’s “formal equality” approach to sex equality in sports); Deborah Brake, The Struggle for 
Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind Title IX, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 13, 28-29 
(describing as “structuralism, or new structuralism,” Title IX’s “critical approach to 
differences between men and women and their significance in equality law”); Erin E. Buzuvis, 
Survey Says… A Critical Analysis of the New Title IX Policy and a Proposal for Reform, 91 
IOWA L. REV. 821, 825 (2006) (describing Title IX’s theory as a “structuralist equality”); 
David S. Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 217, 263 (2005) 
(describing Title IX as going beyond “formal equality” to take a “substantive equality” 
approach); Jessica E. Jay, Women’s Participation in Sports: Four Feminist Perspectives, 7 
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 19 (1997) (describing Title IX as “a formal equality law”). 
4See, e.g., Earl C, Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Ironies, Inconsistencies, and 
Intercollegiate Athletics: Title IX, Title VII, and Statistical Evidence of Discrimination, 1 VA. 
J. SPORTS & L. 177, 179-80 (1999) (criticizing Title IX as inconsistent with the prevailing 
theory of discrimination as reflected in Title VII). 
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a coherent foundational theory of law.5  Foundational theory strives for a unifying 
principle that justifies legal intervention and directs, top-down, law’s approach to 
legal problems.6  Foundational theory seeks legitimacy from its (aspirational) 
consistency with core principles and rejects result-oriented methods of analysis.  
Specific legal principles are derived from more general principles of justice through 
normative reasoning.  Counter to foundationalism, pragmatism rejects the possibility 
of deducing legal rules from a priori moral principles and the dichotomy between 
moral values and “mere” convention. 
Pragmatism developed as an alternative to, and critique of, foundational theory.  
As a philosophical movement, pragmatism originated in the late 19th century and 
flourished in the first quarter of the 20th century.  Today it is understood as a 
distinctly American philosophical movement, led by major thinkers such as Charles 
Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey and (less officially), Oliver Wendell 
Holmes.7  Because it is often defined as a historical movement, the substance of 
pragmatism is difficult to pin down, in part because pragmatism’s intellectual 
creators diverged significantly in their views, which took many nuanced turns and 
shifted over time.  Nevertheless, the American pragmatists shared a common critique 
of normative, deductive philosophy and an emphasis on the practical, experiential 
consequences of a concept.8  The classical pragmatists rejected dichotomies between 
theory and action, and emphasized the interrelationships between action, values and 
knowledge.9  They valued theory for what it could do, rather than for its abstract 
coherence or logical purity. 
The resurgence of pragmatism in the legal academy in the late 20th and early 
21st centuries is generally attributed to the work of Richard Rorty, which draws upon 
(even as it departs from, in some respects) the classical American pragmatic 
thinkers.10  Like the earlier pragmatists, Rorty’s work is known for its “attacks on 
foundationalism, essentialism, and scientism.”11  As Rorty explains, referring to two 
well-known legal theorists, “[Ronald] Dworkin and [John Hart] Ely want a 
                                                                
5See Susan Haack, On Legal Pragmatism: Where Does “The Path of the Law” Lead Us?, 
50 AM. J. JURIS. 71, 71 (2005) (citing myriad scholarly books and law review articles 
embracing pragmatism in recent years). 
6The sense of foundationalism that I mean to invoke here, in contrasting it with 
pragmatism, is what Susan Haack describes as a commitment to justifying beliefs (and rules) 
based on timeless moral values and not mere convention.  Id. at 104. 
7Id. at 77-79 (discussing the leading American pragmatists and Holmes’ place among 
them). 
8Id. at 75. See also Richard Warner, Why Pragmatism? The Puzzling Place of Pragmatism 
in Critical Theory, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 535, 539-40 n.22 (1993) (describing the historic roots 
of pragmatism). 
9Warner, supra note 8, at 539-540 n22. 
10For a sampling of scholarly articles exemplifying this trend, see the articles in 
Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmastism is American Legal Thought, in 63 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1569-1853 (1990), and the selections in PRAGMATISM IN LAW & SOCIETY (Michael Brint 
& William Weaver eds., 1991). 
11Haack, supra note 5, at 75. 
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distinction between principle and policy, which pragmatists must refuse them.”12  
Whether understood as an extension of classical American pragmatism or a 
significantly different neo-pragmatist movement,13 Rorty’s work has had a 
significant impact on the legal academy and the philosophy of law.14 
As a framework for legal theory, pragmatism is eclectic and diverse.  So much so 
that one critic of pragmatism’s influence on legal theory, Susan Haack, has described 
legal pragmatism as “a desperately confusing scholarly mare’s nest.”15  She criticizes 
legal scholars who draw on pragmatism to signal a plethora of different ideas, 
including an aversion to theory, creativity in solving legal problems, a dismissal of 
meta-theory as a basis for claims about the “truth,” the privileging of concrete over 
abstract approaches, a critique of formalism, and an attention to context and open 
dialogue, to name just a few.16  Similarly, pragmatism’s broad appeal to legal 
scholars with otherwise irreconcilably divergent positions has caused some critics to 
question how a theory that appeals to such a discordant group can have any 
substance at all.17  If feminists, critical race theorists, and judge and scholar Richard 
Posner are all relying on pragmatism, they ask, is there any “there” there, or is 
pragmatism merely a mirror reflecting what each scholar brings to it? 
However, pragmatism’s ability to accommodate a number of different ideas  and 
political perspectives should not necessarily be an indictment.  Feminist legal theory 
itself is host to a plurality of different ideas and approaches, yet still has meaning as 
                                                                
12Richard Rorty, Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1811, 1818, n.44 (1990). 
13Some scholars who study Rorty find him to be more of a relativist than at least some of 
the classical pragmatists.  As Susan Haack explains: 
[O]nce Rorty got hold of James, pragmatism took a sharply radical turn: what could be 
further from Peirce’s observations that the truth ‘is SO, whether you, or I, or anybody 
believes it is so or not,’ and that ‘every man is fully convinced that there is such a 
thing as truth, or he would not ask any question’ than Rorty’s cheerful boast that he 
‘does not have much use for the notion of ‘objective truth’,’ or his breezy assurance 
that truth is ‘entirely a matter of solidarity’? 
Haack, supra note 5, at 77. 
14See Warner, supra note 8, at 540 n.23 (describing Rorty’s influence); Brian Z. 
Tamanaha, Pragmatism in U.S. Legal Theory: Its Application to Normative Jurisprudence, 
Sociolegal Studies, and the Fact-Value Distinction, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 315, 338 (1996) 
(discussing Rorty’s attack on foundationalism and its influence on legal scholars).  
15Haack, supra note 5, at 74.  
16Id. at 71-73.   Legal pragmatism is not so much anti-theory as a call for a reevaluation of 
how we theorize.  It rejects a dichotomy between theory and practice, urging instead an 
approach to theory that is anchored in the real world, rejects abstraction, and is suitable for 
changing social life. Cf. id. at 85 (offering a similar interpretation of Oliver Wendall Holmes’s 
approach to legal theory).  
17See, e.g., Tamanaha, supra note 14, at 316 (“The most revealing aspect about this rush to 
pragmatism is precisely the fact that it can accommodate such divergent positions. Anything 
which appeals to the entire spectrum of political views must be empty of substance. Pragmatic 
philosophy, therefore, has little to offer normative legal theory.”). 
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a framework for legal theory.18  Like feminism, even though pragmatism serves as an 
intellectual base for a broad array of possibly diverging ideas, it is still possible to 
discern some common features of a pragmatist approach. 
One notable feature of pragmatism is its embrace of a method of justification that 
relies on internal norms rather than external “objective” ones.  As Richard Warner 
explains, pragmatism approaches the question, “[w]hat makes the prevailing norms 
the right ones?” with the recognition that:  
[S]uch assessment is always internal to the norms in question. We assess 
how well our norms work by using those very norms.  The distinctively 
pragmatic claim about justification is that there can be no external 
standard of evaluation: our norms of justification neither have nor need a 
ground outside themselves.19  
Catharine Wells makes a similar point when she identifies as a core feature of 
pragmatism the insight that no separable “truth” can serve as a foundation for a 
wider theory.20  In other words, to return to the example of Title IX, instead of 
measuring the worth of the law by its coherence with some external standard of 
justice, a pragmatist would measure the worth of any particular interpretation of Title 
IX by evaluating how well it works according to what we take to be the goals of Title 
IX itself. 
A related feature of pragmatism is its rejection of unifying normative theory and 
the project of deducing specific principles from meta-principles of justice.  In this 
vein, Thomas Grey has described pragmatism’s core feature as “freedom from theory 
guilt.”21  Catharine Wells cites Grey’s admonition as an antidote to the legal 
academy’s obsession with normative theory.22  Although pragmatism is not anti-
theory per se, it is skeptical of global theory.23  As Wells explains, pragmatism frees 
us from the straightjacket of normative theory, where legal questions have to fit into 
a systematic agenda, and the push for a “unified theory of the whole world.”24  In this 
way, pragmatism is empirical, not epistemological.25  In other words, the rightness of 
a theory turns on how it works, not its logical foundations. 
                                                                
18See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 1-14 (2d ed. 
2003) (describing the commonalities and diversity of feminist legal theory). 
19Warner, supra note 8, at 541-42; see also id. at 544 (describing pragmatism as 
“characterized by the assertion that the norms of justification actually used in society neither 
have nor need a ground outside themselves”). 
20Catharine Pierce Wells, Why Pragmatism Works for Me, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 347 (2000). 
21Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theory, 
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569, 1569 (1990) (“Pragmatism is freedom from theory-guilt.”). 
22Wells, supra note 20, at 358. 
23See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as 
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 323 (1990) (discussing pragmatism’s emphasis on 
“the concrete situatedness of the interpretive enterprise, which militates against overarching 
theories”). 
24Wells, supra note 20, at 355. 
25Id. 
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A third feature of pragmatism is its emphasis on the importance of perspective in 
making sense of observations.26  Pragmatism treats knowledge as contingent and the 
product of a knowledge-seeking community at a particular time.  Knowledge does 
not exist in the abstract, “out there” waiting to be discovered.  Perspective is critical 
in making sense of the world.  Since there is no “neutral” perspective, the best we 
can do is continually strive to challenge and broaden the perspective that we bring to 
a problem. 
Even after identifying core features of pragmatism, there is still a great deal of 
open space in pragmatism as a legal method.  Pragmatism is more of an indictment 
of a particular kind of normative theorizing than it is a recipe for any specific 
direction in theorizing.  As Catharine Wells, a proponent of pragmatism, 
acknowledges, “Once one is freed from the demands of global theory, however, it is 
not quite clear what happens next.”27 
Pragmatism’s open space has served as a launching point for critics of 
pragmatism who have chided critical legal theorists, primarily critical race theorists 
and feminists, for using pragmatism to bolster their substantive agendas.  These 
critics have questioned the use of pragmatism by critical legal theorists, charging that 
they rely on pragmatism to bring legitimacy to their movement but distort 
pragmatism in the process.28  They contend that pragmatism’s rejection of objective 
moral truth and its agnosticism toward particular substantive values provide no 
traction for social critiques with a substantive vision of justice, such as critical race 
theory or feminism. 
However, this criticism overlooks the possibility of a dialectical relationship 
between pragmatism and critical theory, in which each school of thought enriches the 
other, rather than remaining fixed and constant.29  For example, feminism’s focus on 
women’s experience can help ensure that pragmatism lives up to its commitment to 
the centrality of experience in producing knowledge by making sure that women’s 
experiences are fully included and incorporated.30  Similarly, feminism’s 
commitment to the importance of gender to understanding social, cultural and legal 
phenomena can help answer the burning question left by pragmatism of which 
contexts matter in applying its experiential approach to theory.31  Pragmatism’s 
                                                                
26Id. 
27Id. at 358. 
28See, e.g., Warner, supra note 8, at 535-37 (“Pragmatism . . . does not permit any 
particular conception of justice to be non-relatively privileged over any other” and “yields 
relativism about truth and justice.”). See also Tamanaha, supra note 14, at 318 (“[P]ragmatism 
is of scant benefit to normative legal theory but essential to sociolegal studies.”). 
29Cf. CHARLENE HADDOCK SEIGFRIED, PRAGMATISM AND FEMINISM: REWEAVING THE 
SOCIAL FABRIC 17 (1996) (“I am convinced that pragmatist theory has resources for feminist 
theory untapped by other approaches and that feminism, in turn, can uniquely reinvigorate 
pragmatism.”). 
30Id. at 37 (“Pragmatism needs feminism to carry out its own stated program, since 
feminists are in the forefront of philosophers addressing the social and political issues that 
affect women.”). 
31Id. at 39 (“Pragmatist philosophy, for instance, explains why the neglect of context is the 
besetting fallacy of philosophical thought.  Feminism cogently and extensively shows how 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss4/7
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agnosticism about the superiority of any particular perspective risks obscuring 
hidden commitments that in fact privilege a particular perspective.  Feminism’s 
insights into the gender dimensions of the illusory “view from nowhere” can help 
keep pragmatism honest and illuminate the places where various perspectives 
diverge and where they share common ground.32  Finally, feminism’s substantive 
commitment to gender justice can help fill the void of substantive values in 
pragmatism and help pragmatism in its project to seek “recourse to the practices and 
institutions of everyday life, both to dismantle the social and political structures of 
oppression and to develop better alternatives.”33  Rather than viewing feminism’s 
appropriation of pragmatist ideas as “distorting” pragmatism, we should recognize 
the value of mapping the intersections of pragmatism and feminism to facilitate a 
cross-pollination of ideas, some of which overlap, and some of which challenge and 
reshape ideas in the other.34  
As feminism has the potential to enrich pragmatism, so too does pragmatism 
contain insights valuable to feminist theorizing.  Even if pragmatism is largely about 
method and not itself a foundation for substantive values,35 feminists have long 
understood the importance of method.  Indeed, a number of feminist legal scholars 
have found important intersections between pragmatism and feminist legal methods.  
For example, Margaret Jane Radin describes pragmatism’s substantial area of 
overlap with feminist legal theory as: “a commitment against abstract idealism, 
transcendence, foundationalism, and atemporal universality; and in favor of 
immanence, historicity, concreteness, situatedness, contextuality, embeddednes, 
narrativity of meaning.”36  Pragmatism’s rejection of formalism, emphasis on 
experience, affinity for interdisciplinary work, and understanding of knowledge as 
situational make it a hospitable intellectual framework for exploring feminist 
critiques of law and society.  
One feature of pragmatism that particularly resonates with feminist scholars is its 
emphasis on context in any evaluation of the “correctness” of a legal result or moral 
                                                           
gender, race, class, and sexual preference are crucial parts of context that philosophy has 
traditionally neglected.”). 
32Id. at 10.  As Charlene Seigried explains: 
In making explicit its own interpretive space, feminism can help to identify the hidden 
assumptions of pragmatist analyses and to demonstrate the crucial difference between 
merely acknowledging other perspectives and coming to terms with the consequences 
of such recognition.  This confrontation of a particular perspective with the defense of 
perspectivisim opens the possibility for new insights into the effort to both privilege 
the unique struggles of women, of different ethnic groups, of the economically 
deprived, of homosexuals and lesbians, and to affirm a common struggle. 
Id. 
33Id. at 18. 
34Cf. id. at 16 (“As we appropriate what is valuable in each other’s perspective, the 
distortions in our own perspective, as viewed from theirs, must also be acknowledged, and this 
recognition will affect the character of what remains.”). 
35Tamanaha, supra note 14, at 328 (explaining that pragmatism is “a methodology of 
inquiry and a theory of truth” that does not itself “present any truths about the world”). 
36Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW & 
SOCIETY 127, 134 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991). 
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principle.  As Martha Minow and Elizabeth Spellman explain, “A pragmatist casts 
doubt on the possibility of sovereign reason, removed from historical situations 
 . . . .”37  Minow and Spellman rearticulate feminism’s and pragmatism’s parallel 
calls for relentless attention to the importance of context.  While some critics have 
dismissed this call for context as redundant, insisting that we are all always already 
“in context,”38 the reality of context does not in itself prevent the errors of abstract 
theorizing.  While pragmatism does not identify which elements of context to 
emphasize, greater recognition of why and how context matters can draw more 
attention to, and dialogue about, which contexts matter and why.  Feminism’s 
substantive values and visions for gender equality can help provide answers to such 
questions. 
Another useful feature of pragmatism for feminists is its approach to knowledge 
as situated, and not simply “objective,” discoverable or already “out there.”  
Catharine Wells praises pragmatism for its sophisticated understanding of 
knowledge, as contingent, situated, and relational.39  Knowledge does not exist apart 
from the knowledge-seeker.  As Wells explains, pragmatism recognizes that “beliefs 
are not simply efforts to record the truth; they are constitutive of who we are and 
what we do.”40  Pragmatism invites a critical approach to consciousness and accepted 
“truths” that is helpful to feminists: it highlights the importance of social 
construction in “what we think we know.”41  Of particular importance to feminist 
theorizing, pragmatism facilitates the understanding that “‘what works’ is a relative 
concept” depending on “what are our goals? What is the time frame? And what 
values must be preserved?”42  Wells finds this approach to knowledge liberating, 
rather than nihilistic, and encouraging of creativity.  As she explains, “[i]f all 
knowledge is partial, then we must be eclectic and pluralistic in our appreciation of 
individual theories.”43   
This understanding of knowledge as partial and situated can help feminists resist 
the legal academy’s tendency to insist on theoretical consistency and unifying 
theory.  As Wells explains, the quest for grand theory can be stifling by insisting that 
you can’t get to X until you have a coherent theory for Y in relation to X.  She offers 
as an example,  
the way in which feminist theorists were frequently prevented from 
discussing gender differences until they offered a theory as to whether 
such differences were innate or learned. Since questions of nature and 
nurture are generally unanswerable, the effect of these interruptions was 
to silence an important set of discussions.44   
                                                                
37Martha Minow & Elizabeth Spelman, In Context, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1597, 1620 (1990).   
38Tamanaha, supra note 14, at 334-35. 
39Wells, supra note 20, at 349.  
40Id.     
41Id. at 350. 
42Id. at 354.  
43Id. at 358. 
44Id. at 358 n.39.  
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A similar demand for theoretical coherence has forced feminist theorists to stay 
stuck in the equal treatment/special treatment debate, refusing feminists the option of 
picking any approach that cannot be justified across the board or parsed with 
principled and not merely ad hoc distinctions. 
Pragmatism also supports feminism’s rejection of a dichotomy between theory 
and practice and its push for an integrative praxis.  Pragmatism rejects dualities, and 
the pragmatist movement sharply rebuked foundational/normative theorists who treat 
theory as separate from practical experience.  The classical pragmatists predated 
feminists in using the term “praxis” to call for a synthesizing of theory and action.45   
Pragmatism’s refusal to view abstraction as a higher order of thinking, detachable 
from the concrete, offers support for feminist methods that explore how the 
particular and concrete shape our understanding of what is just and moral.  As 
Martha Fineman has instructed, "the task of feminists concerned with the law and 
legal institutions must be to create and explicate feminist methods and theories that 
explicitly challenge and compete with the existing totalizing nature of grand legal 
theory."46  
Perhaps pragmatism’s greatest contribution to feminist legal scholarship has been 
its utility in responding to the double-bind that arises when women challenge their 
subordination.  Margaret Jane Radin, for example, has argued that pragmatism is 
especially useful for grappling with the double-bind, which materializes wherever 
there is gender oppression, and sets up a dilemma about how to address it.47  
One of the classic double-binds that has consumed much feminist energy is the 
question of how best to respond to gender inequality that is tied to the condition of 
pregnancy.48  On the one hand, discrimination against pregnant women might be 
addressed by requiring employers to treat men and women the same with regard to 
all physically limiting conditions, so that employers would have to treat pregnancy as 
comparable to other medical conditions.  While this approach might stop employers 
from singling out pregnancy for uniquely adverse treatment, it does nothing to 
challenge masculine workplace norms that do not accommodate or account for 
women’s experience of pregnancy and childbearing.  An alternative approach might 
require employers to bend their workplace rules and structures to better fit women’s 
experience of pregnancy, mandating, for example, paid leaves and other workplace 
accommodations necessary for women to become mothers and still keep their jobs.  
However, this approach risks further stigmatizing women as different and inferior 
laborers by making the employment of women more expensive and highlighting 
women’s reproductive activity, marking them as less committed and reliable 
                                                                
45See Haack, supra note 5, at 76 (“James stressed the connection between ‘pragmatic’ and 
the Greek ‘praxis,’ ‘action,’ as contrasted with theory.”). 
46Martha Albertson Fineman, AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 
xi, xiii (Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1991). 
47Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699 (1990).  
See also Margaret Jane Radin & Frank Michaelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical 
Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1049-51 (1991) (discussing pragmatism and how it 
complements feminism). 
48See CHAMALLAS, supra note 18, at 42-44 (discussing the equal treatment versus special 
treatment debate among feminist legal theorists). 
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workers.49  The impossibility of solving the one problem without creating others is 
known as the double-bind.50   
Professor Radin explains that pragmatism helps feminists respond to the double-
bind by releasing them from the drive to solve it once and for all with a uniform, 
consistent strategy.  The ideal would be to dissolve the dominant conception of 
gender that produces the double-bind.  However, doing this requires greater social 
empowerment than the dominant conception of gender allows.  In order to make 
progress, Radin argues, we need to work within nonideal conditions to transition 
toward the ideal.  As she explains, “We must look carefully at the nonideal 
circumstances in each case and decide which horn of the dilemma is better (or less 
bad), and we must keep re-deciding as time goes on.”51  This requires feminist 
strategies that are particular, tailored to the specific problem at hand, and continually 
reevaluated as social conditions change.  Pragmatism reminds us, “There is no 
general solution; there are only piecemeal, temporary solutions.”52 
While pragmatism has much to offer feminism, feminists should also be aware of 
the risks of following a pragmatist approach.  One charge leveled against pragmatism 
that should be of particular concern to feminists is that it invites moral relativism and 
that its rejection of universal truth obstructs efforts to promote justice.  Some 
feminist scholars sympathetic to pragmatism have responded by pointing out that the 
very absence of moral absolutes presents an opportunity to strengthen our moral 
commitments because it necessitates greater attention to how we define our own 
communities and commitments.  Feminist scholar and defender-of-pragmatism Joan 
Williams begins her answer to the charge of relativism by reminding us that there is 
no neutral position from which to distill absolute, universal principles.53  Rather, the 
perception of moral certainties reflects deeply ingrained, unarticulated beliefs that 
the community holds about itself.  As Williams explains, responding to the assertion 
of a widely shared belief in an absolute moral position that torture is wrong: 
[T]hese certainties reflect not abject truth, but the grammar of what it 
means to be us. The torture of innocents is wrong because it violates our 
                                                                
49See Radin, supra note 47, at 1701 (discussing the double-bind as it applies to the 
problem of pregnancy). 
50See CHAMALLAS, supra note 18, at 8-10 (discussing the problem of the double-bind); see 
also Radin, supra note 47, at 1700 (“[T]he fact of oppression is what gives rise to the double-
bind.”). 
51See Radin, supra note 47, at 1700. 
52Id. at 1701; see also id. at 1704 (“The pragmatist solution is to confront each dilemma 
separately and choose the alternative that will hinder empowerment the least and further it the 
most.  The pragmatist feminist need not seek a general solution that will dictate how to resolve 
all double-bind issues.  Appropriate solutions may all differ, depending on the current stage of 
women’s empowerment, and how the proposed solution might move the current social 
conception of gender and our vision of how gender should be reconceived for the future.  
Indeed, the “same” double-bind may demand a different solution tomorrow from the one we 
find best today.”). 
53Joan C. Williams, Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze, in 
PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 155, 158 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991). 
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culture’s celebration of the individual and our sense of the essential 
dignity and equality of human beings.54[CMLaw1] 
Professor Williams’ response turns the relativism objection into a virtue of 
pragmatism, by exposing the reality that the process of defining a community’s 
moral commitments is not an exercise of abstract deductive reason but a community-
defining act.  In Williams’ words, “Ethical choices offer not opportunities for appeal 
to absolutes, but the chance to find out who we are and who we want to be.”55  The 
articulation and defense of our moral commitments without appeal to “objective” 
truth “offers us a chance to step back and examine the structure of our form of life, to 
assess the hidden costs of our ideals.”56  Thus, pragmatism forces us to take 
responsibility for the reach of our moral commitments, their limits as well as their 
breadth.  As Williams concludes: 
Pragmatists should object to the notion of moral absolutes not because we 
want people to be free to torture or enslave, but because using the 
language of absolutes lets us evade the troubling fact that our moral 
choices fall on a continuum on which we set limits far short of our power 
to intervene.57 
Thus, Williams makes a strong case that pragmatism’s rejection of moral 
absolutes is not only compatible with feminism, but enriches feminism’s 
commitment to holding communities accountable for the values they select.  The 
rejection of absolutes also promotes a feminist agenda by drawing attention to the 
importance of perspective in evaluating how well our chosen values work and whom 
they serve. 
The charge of moral relativism leveled against pragmatism is also vulnerable to 
criticism for its premise that pragmatism invites a conception of truth that is 
individualistic.  However, pragmatism insists upon a collective approach to seeking 
out truth and knowledge.  Hilary Putnam, for example, a leading modern philosopher 
of pragmatism, dismisses the claim that pragmatism lets each person pick his or her 
own truth.  As he explains: 
Some critics even read [William] James—against repeated statements to 
the contrary, explicit and implicit, in his writing—as holding that if the 
consequences of believing that p are good for you, then p is “true for you.”  
Let me say once and for all that James never used the notion of “true for 
me” or “true for you.”  Truth, he insists, is a notion which presupposes a 
community, and, like Peirce, he held that the widest possible community, 
                                                                
54Id. at 157. 
55Id. at 161. 
56Id. 
57Id. at 163-64; see also Wells, supra note 20, at 354 (“While pragmatism relieves us of 
the need for metaphysical justification, it also requires us to become clear about our culture 
and about our own identities within that culture.”). 
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the community of all persons (and possibly all sentient beings) in the long 
run, is the relevant one.58  
Instead of promoting an individualistic conception of truth, pragmatism 
emphasizes the importance of community in the pragmatist method of truth-seeking, 
and demands that the truth-seeking community be defined inclusively.59   
Pragmatism’s emphasis on the importance of inclusive communities in the truth-
seeking process is particularly helpful to feminists, who have long critiqued the 
claims of universal knowledge that emerge from communities that are not 
representative of women’s voices.  For these reasons, the relativist objection should 
not persuade feminists to keep their distance from pragmatism. 
Another potential drawback to pragmatism is that it leaves itself vulnerable to 
charges of theoretical inconsistency as part of a backlash against progressive change.  
A legal strategy that does not fit into a theoretically pure framework might prompt 
charges of a double-standard or ad hoc instrumentalism that lacks a persuasive 
foundation.  However, my own sense is that theoretical consistency is no more likely 
to succeed in defusing or preventing a backlash.60  A backlash reflects a power 
struggle rather than a search for truth or purity of ideas.  Rather than striving for 
theoretical consistency to fend off the inevitable backlash that accompanies progress 
toward gender equality, feminists should meet the backlash head-on by seeking to 
shift the cultural norms that give it life and power. 
Having sketched the contours of pragmatism and its promise for feminist legal 
theory, the remainder of this article will examine Title IX as an example of a 
pragmatic feminist approach, and evaluate the law through a pragmatist lens.  Before 
considering Title IX’s approach to theory and how it works, however, it is important 
to take stock of the context of the problem the law is addressing since, to a 
pragmatist, context is everything.  The complexity of gender subordination in sports 
both demonstrates the need for a pragmatic approach and provides crucial detail for 
considering the effectiveness of Title IX.  Pragmatism’s exhortation to build legal 
strategy from the ground up, rather than deducing it from abstract principles of 
justice, requires that any evaluation of the law’s theory be based on an understanding 
of the social problem of gender inequality in sports.  
III.  THE SLIPPERINESS OF SUBORDINATION AND THE MANY FACES OF GENDER 
OPPRESSION IN SPORTS 
Developing a legal theory for addressing gender inequality in sports requires 
careful study of the historically situated and shifting structures that contribute to the 
problem.  Like other settings characterized by gender subordination, gender 
inequality in sports is complex and multi-dimensional.  A unitary theory of 
discrimination law may not be advisable when subordination takes many varied and 
complex forms. 
                                                                
58HILARY PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM: AN OPEN QUESTION 24, n.7 (Blackwell Publishers 
1995). 
59Id. at 70-74. 
60Cf. Radin, supra note 47, at 1701 (“For a group subject to structures of domination, all 
roads thought to be progressive can pack a backlash.”). 
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The dominant understanding of “discrimination” is too simplistic to capture the 
gender inequality that concerns feminists.  The legal construct of discrimination 
usually signifies an individualized harm to a particular person, perpetrated by an 
individual acting out of conscious bias against the target’s social group.  Even 
individualized bias is much more complicated than this account, which also fails to 
capture the structural inequality and the institutionalized practices that subordinate 
women in sports.  Rather than use the term discrimination, and its connotation of 
individualized, willful action, I will use (interchangeably) the terms subordination 
and oppression.   
Gender subordination in sports stems from a complex set of structures and 
practices with multiple dimensions and supporting ideologies.  One framework for 
thinking about gender subordination in sports comes from Iris Marion Young’s work 
identifying and describing “five faces of oppression.”61[CMLaw2]   Although Young’s 
analysis is centered on social groups in relation to labor markets and employment, 
much of her discussion has analogues in sport and can help illuminate the complexity 
of gender subordination in sport. 
Young’s first category of oppression is exploitation.  She draws on Karl Marx’s 
theory of capital to explain how exploitation operates to reproduce class domination 
despite the formal freedom given individuals.  To Young, the “central insight” of the 
concept of exploitation is the “steady process of the transfer of the results of the 
labor of some people to benefit others.”62  In other words, “the energies of the have-
nots are continuously expended to maintain and augment the power, status and 
wealth of the haves.”63  As examples of gender exploitation, Young discusses the 
structure of the patriarchal family and how the removal of men from caretaking 
responsibilities results in the exploitation of women’s domestic labor.  In addition, 
women in the workplace disproportionately hold typically “feminine” jobs involving 
sexual, caretaking or nurturing tasks that enhance the status and comfort of men, 
while leaving women unnoticed and under-compensated.64  
Conceptualized as the transfer of labor for the ownership and benefit of others, 
all athletes might be viewed as exploited to the extent that they are controlled by and 
add value to their institutions disproportionate to the benefits they themselves 
receive.  Athletic power-house colleges and universities are notorious for exploiting 
high-performing male athletes (many of whom are men of color and men from 
lower-class backgrounds) in elite sports, using them to enrich their institutions 
without ensuring that they receive an adequate education or are prepared for a life 
after sports.65  While a few of these athletes manage to find careers in elite 
                                                                
61Iris Marion Young, Five Faces of Oppression, in RETHINKING POWER 174 (Thomas E. 
Wartenberg ed., 1992). 
62Id. at 183. 
63Id. 
64Id. at 184. 
65See, e.g., N. Jeremi Duru, Friday Night ‘Lite’: How De-Racialization in the Motion 
Picture Friday Night Lights Disserves the Movement to Eradicate Racial Discrimination from 
American Sport, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 485, 512-513 (2007) (discussing the 
commodification and exploitation of black student-athletes); Sarah E. Gohl, Note: A Lesson in 
English and Gender: Title IX and the Male Student-Athlete, 50 DUKE L. J. 1123, 1132-42, 
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professional sports, the majority of them leave college without the skills to succeed 
in life after their college sports careers end.66   
Less attention has been given to forms of exploitation that distinctly affect female 
athletes.  “Selling” women’s sports has often entailed the hetero-sexualization of 
female athletes as a way of generating public support for watching and promoting 
women’s sports.  Marketing strategies for women sports often highlight the athletes’ 
femininity and sexuality rather than their athletic ability.  Sport scholars Leslie 
Heywood and Shari Dworkin have called this “the babe factor,” referring to the 
necessity for popular women’s sports teams to have high-profile attractive, feminine 
athletes in order to gain a following.67  Female athletes still receive more press for 
their appearance and sexuality than their athleticism.68   
In addition, the commodification of elite athletes is not limited to male athletes. 
Highly competitive college sports programs increasingly commodify female athletes 
too, valuing them primarily for what they add to the team’s winning record and the 
marketability of the program.  Indeed, female athletes may be especially vulnerable 
to coaches who place undue pressure on athletes to win at all costs, at great sacrifice 
to their physical health, academic achievement and social lives.69  Heyman and 
Dworkin argue that female athletes who most need sport’s self-esteem boost are the 
most vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation by coaches, including the minute 
regulation of their diet, exercise and personal lives, and the pressure to overtrain.70  
The win-at-all cost model of competitive sports may inhibit sports’ potential to 
empower women.71 
A second face of oppression Young identifies is marginalization, which she 
describes as relegating some persons to a marginal position outside the labor market, 
rendering them unemployed or unemployable.  Although Young’s discussion of 
marginalization focuses on exclusion from the labor market, the concept she 
                                                           
1146-1150 (2001) (criticizing the exploitation of male student athletes by Division I athletic 
programs). 
66See Duru, supra note 65, at 512 n.138 (summarizing NCAA data on the extremely low 
probability of a college student-athlete landing an opportunity to play professional sports). 
67LESLIE HEYWOOD & SHARI L. DWORKIN, BUILT TO WIN: THE FEMALE ATHLETE AS 
CULTURAL ICON 39 (Toby Miller & M. Ann Hall eds., Univ. of Minn. Press, Sport and Culture 
Series vol. 5, 2003). 
68See id. 
69See, e.g., SANDRA KIRBY, ET AL., THE DOME OF SILENCE: SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND 
ABUSE IN SPORT 79 (Brenda Conroy ed., 2000) (discussing study finding a gendered impact on 
how athletes experience put-downs and insults by coaches: 54.7% of female athletes and 
29.1% of male athletes experience put-downs or insults by their coach as serious enough to 
cause them distress); see also JOAN RYAN, LITTLE GIRLS IN PRETTY BOXES: THE MAKING AND 
BREAKING OF ELITE GYMNASTS AND FIGURE SKATERS 63 (Warner Books 1996) (1995) 
(discussing a 1992 University of Washington study finding that out of 182 female college 
athletes, 32% practiced some form of eating disorder, such as vomiting, use of laxatives, 
diuretics or diet pills, compared to 18% of the general female population). 
70See HEYWOOD & DWORKIN, supra note 67, at 48. 
71Id. at 49. 
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elaborates is broad enough to encompass exclusion from other socially valued 
activities as well, including sports.72   
In sports, women are marginalized when they are excluded from highly valued 
sports opportunities, relegated to the sidelines (literally, in the case of cheerleading) 
and limited to less-valued activities.  Among the harms of marginalization identified 
by Young are material deprivation (in the case of sports, the financial resources that 
accompany participation in sports, including athletic scholarships) and the social and 
personal harms of feelings of “uselessness, boredom, lack of self-respect.”73  
Through marginalization, women’s exclusion from highly-valued sports 
opportunities “blocks [their] opportunity to exercise capacities in socially defined 
and recognized ways.”74  In other words, limited opportunities in sports deny women 
of the status and social gains available to men who participate in highly-valued 
sports.   
Marginalization is an important historic and continuing feature of women’s 
oppression in sports.  Although women are no longer barred entirely from 
competitive school sports, they continue to have access to significantly fewer 
opportunities and resources in intercollegiate and interscholastic athletics.  Women 
are also effectively excluded from participating in certain male-defined contact 
sports by Title IX’s contact-sports exception and are denied opportunities that would 
enable them to develop interests and abilities in such sports.75  As coaches, women 
are excluded from the most lucrative and highly-valued coaching positions, coaching 
men’s teams, and are effectively limited to lower paid and less valued positions 
coaching women’s teams.76 
The third face of oppression Young identifies is powerlessness.  Young defines 
this criteria in reference to social status rather than economic class, making a 
distinction between professionals and nonprofessionals and the status difference this 
distinction entails.  As she explains, “[p]owerlessness . . . describes the lives of 
people who have little or no work autonomy, exercise little creativity or judgment in 
their work, have no technical expertise or authority . . . and do not command 
respect.”77  She identifies three aspects of status privilege that go along with being a 
“professional”: (1) having a specialized knowledge that goes along with a person’s 
progressive development of their abilities and resulting career advancement; (2) 
having considerable authority over others and day-to-day autonomy; and (3) having a 
measure of social “respectability” that encourages others to treat you with a 
“respectful distance or deference.”78   
                                                                
72Cf. Young, supra note 61, at 188 (“Most of this society’s productive and recognized 
activities take place in contexts of organized social cooperation, and social structures and 
processes that close persons out of participation in such social cooperation are unjust.”); id. at 
186 (explaining that some persons are “expelled from useful participation in social life”). 
73Id. at 186; id. at 188. 
74Iris Marion Young, Five Faces of Oppression, in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A CIVIL 
RIGHTS READER 73 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds. 1995).   
75See infra text at notes 113-115. 
76See Brake, supra note 3, at 83-92. 
77Young, supra note 74, at 75. 
78Id. at 75-76. 
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In comparison with men, women are relatively powerless in sports.  The 
professional ranks of sports—the term “professional” being used here to connote the 
leadership ranks of intercollegiate sports—are largely reserved for men.  With few 
exceptions, men are the leaders, power-brokers, and persons of authority in 
competitive sports.  Men are the vast majority of coaches (and nearly all of them, in 
jobs coaching male athletes), administrators and directors of athletic programs.79  
The positioning of men as the power-brokers in sport, and the precarious place of 
women in sport leadership positions, has the effect of silencing the few women in 
leadership positions who might criticize and seek to change the gender power 
balance in sports.  The few women who rise through the ranks to hold elite positions 
in sport have to struggle for respect and authority.  The overwhelmingly male tilt in 
the leadership of sports sets a ceiling on the aspirations of female athletes who might 
otherwise pursue sports-related careers.  
Cultural imperialism is the fourth face of oppression identified by Young, 
differing from the prior three in their focus on people’s material lives.  Young 
describes cultural imperialism as, “the experience of existing in a society whose 
dominant meanings render the particular perspectives and point of view of one’s own 
group invisible at the same time as they stereotype one’s group and mark it out as 
‘other.’”80  In cultural imperialism, the dominant group promotes “the 
universalization of [its] experience and culture and its establishment as the norm.”81  
The subordinate group’s difference from the dominant group “becomes reconstructed 
as deviance and inferiority.”82  Young notes that the resulting oppression is 
“paradoxical” because the outsider group is “both marked out by stereotypes and 
rendered invisible.”83  “The stereotype marks and defines the culturally dominated” 
group, even as the stereotype itself is rendered invisible (and thus difficult to contest) 
by its very pervasiveness in the dominant culture.84  At the same time, the experience 
of being marked as inferior by the dominant group is “internalized . . . at least to the 
degree that [the oppressed group is] forced to react to the behaviors of others that 
express or are influenced by those images.”85  The marking as “other” creates 
opportunities for connection and solidarity within culturally dominated groups, 
                                                                
79See LINDA JEAN CARPENTER & R. VIVIAN ACOSTA, TITLE IX 174 (2005) (stating that in 
2004 women made up 44.1% of the coaches of women’s sports, 2% of the coaches of men’s 
sports, and 18.8% of the head coaches of all intercollegiate sports combined); id. at 175 
(stating that in 2004 women directed only 18.5% of women’s athletic programs, with most of 
those directorships in Division III, while almost one in five athletic departments had no 
women administrators anywhere in the department). 
80Young, supra note 74, at 77. 
81Id. 
82Id. 
83Id. 
84Id.  Thus, as Young explains, “Just as everyone knows that the earth goes around the 
sun, so everyone knows that gay people are promiscuous, that Indians are alcoholics, and that 
women are good with children.”  Id. at 77.  The ability to individuate is a privilege of the 
dominant group.  Id.  For members of the dominant group, “each is whatever he or she wants 
to be, they are what they do, and by their doings they are judged.”  Id. 
85Id. at 77-78.  
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enabling a “double consciousness” where persons within these groups experience 
their own culture and that which is imposed by the dominant group.   
Of the faces of oppression, this one has the clearest application to sports.  The 
marking of women as “other” in sports occurs in myriad ways.  The greater 
institutional value placed on men’s sports is reflected in the allocation of funds.  
Men’s sports receive vastly disproportionate sums of money, and the most masculine 
sports are valued the most highly.  As scholars of sport sociology have explained, it 
is no accident that the most “masculine” sports are the ones most highly valued in 
terms of monetary investment and cultural clout.86  At a literal level, the gendered 
naming of sports teams speaks volumes about the culturally subordinate place of 
women in sports.  Only women’s sports require a gender qualifier.  The University of 
Tennessee basketball program, for example, has The Volunteers and The Lady 
Volunteers.  Men’s sports need no gender qualifier; they are, simply, sports. 
Finally, the fifth face of oppression is violence, by which Young refers to the 
systematic and legitimized violence against members of the group which is regarded 
as unsurprising and often goes unpunished.  Here too, there are applications to 
women in sports.  Men’s sports programs often inculcate a culture of masculinity 
that encourages the sexual exploitation of women, and colleges and universities often 
trivialize, excuse or ignore sexual abuse by their elite male athletes.87  Male coaches 
are also frequent perpetrators of a violent form of male privilege that contributes to 
the subordination of women in sports.88 
The five faces of oppression provide a useful framework for considering the 
many dimensions of gender oppression in sports.  They show that many 
subordinating practices collide and converge to produce gender oppression.   To add 
to the complexity, there is also a temporal dimension to sorting out the various 
practices that subordinate women.  As Reva Siegel’s work demonstrates, 
subordination is not static or ahistoric.89  It can take many forms, shifting when 
                                                                
86See, e.g., Brake, supra note 3, at 93 & n. 410 (citing literature linking male contact 
sports to a privileged masculinity). 
87See id. at 92-107 (discussing institutional complicity in male athletes’ sexual violence 
against women); see also Simpson v. Univ. of Colorado Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 
2007) (reversing and remanding district court’s dismissal of female students’ Title IX suit 
involving alleged sexual assaults by football players); Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. 
Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007) (reversing dismissal of female 
student’s sexual harassment claim for gang-rape by football players where university officials 
recruited players despite knowledge of prior sexual misconduct); Christopher M. Parent, 
Personal Fouls: How Sexual Assaults by Football Players Is Exposing Universities to Title IX 
Liability, 13 FORDHAM INTLL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 617, 618-622 (2003) (summarizing 
incidents involving alleged sexual assaults by football players). 
88See, e.g., Brake, supra note 3, at 90-91 (discussing the problem of abuse of female 
athletes by male coaches; Jennings v. Univ. N.C., 482 F.3d 686 (4th Cir..2007) (reversing 
district court’s grant of summary judgment on a sexual harassment claim where male soccer 
coach allegedly verbally harassed female athlete using sexually explicit language); Baumgardt 
v. Wausau Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 475 F. Supp. 2d 800 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (discussing the 
sexual abuse of female athlete by her basketball and golf coach). 
89See Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” 
Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77, 107-08 (2000) 
(hereinafter Siegel, Discrimination); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: 
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necessary to survive challenges and conform to changing circumstances.  Siegel 
explains that when “status regimes” are contested and threatened with illegitimacy, 
they evolve in response to changing social and legal conditions to assume 
(temporarily) more stable and less-contested forms.  As she explains, “status-
enforcing state action has no fixed or transhistorical form, but instead evolves in rule 
structure and justificatory rhetoric as it is contested.”90  While the abandonment of 
the old form creates the appearance of progress, the new form works to preserve 
inequality through a different guise.  Siegel’s work instructs us not to assume that 
subordination is a fixed social practice, or that the most virulent practices in the past 
still pose the greatest threat today.91   
True to Siegel’s theory, the ideologies and practices that have created and 
sustained women’s exclusion from and inequality within sports have changed 
considerably over time to keep pace with changing social mores and ideology.  The 
dominant practice used to be official exclusion, justified by concerns about harm to 
women’s reproductive systems and maternal roles.  As women’s roles broadened and 
the boundaries of what was compatible with motherhood were contested, the 
ideologies limiting women’s participation in sports shifted to focus more on 
dominant cultural constructions of femininity.  The conflation of sports and 
masculinity created a conflict whereby women’s participation in sports risked 
compromising traditional femininity.  Women who played sports were at risk of 
being culturally marked as not sufficiently feminine, “tomboys,” lesbians.  This 
ideology continues in less overt form to limit women’s sports participation, even as 
the official boundaries of exclusion have loosened considerably.   
Today the confining ideology of femininity is contested, and there is much more 
cultural space for women to play sports and gain status through their participation in 
sports.  Nevertheless, the ideology of gender difference continues to limit women’s 
full equality in sports.  Numerous societal messages promote men’s sports and mark 
them as privileged (with public funds, stadiums, spectators, and scholarships, for 
example), while women’s sports are allotted secondary status and a lower level of 
resources.   
Despite massive cultural shifts, traces of the older ideologies still linger and are 
not wholly without power.  Although the overt assertion that women’s sports 
participation is incompatible with women’s maternal function has long been rejected, 
remnants of the thesis that sports participation is incompatible with maternity persist.  
For example, the plight of female athletes who become pregnant has only recently 
                                                           
The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1116-19 (1997) 
(hereinafter Siegel, Equal Protection); Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife-Beating as 
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2176, 2178 (1996) (hereinafter Siegel, Wife-
Beating). 
90Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 89, at 1119. 
91See generally Siegel, Discrimination, supra note 89; Siegel, Equal Protection, supra 
note 89; Siegel, Wife-Beating, supra note 89.  See also Becker, supra note 3, at 261 (“During 
the 1970s, as it became impermissible to discriminate overtly between women and men in 
many settings, inequality did not disappear. Prohibited sex-specific versions were replaced by 
neutral sounding rules tending to support patriarchy in more subtle ways.”). 
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attracted media attention.92  Despite clear NCAA rules forbidding colleges and 
universities from revoking scholarships because of an athlete’s injury or physical 
condition, some universities require female athletes to sign a contract promising not 
to become pregnant and acknowledging their understanding that their athletic 
scholarships will be revoked if they do.93  A number of reported stories have 
involved pregnant female athletes who lost their scholarships and were excluded 
from their teams because of their pregnancy.94  Under NCAA rules, students with 
other medical conditions or injuries are treated very differently, generally receiving 
red-shirt status that allows them to keep their scholarships while trainers work with 
them to rehabilitate their physical condition with the goal of resuming full 
participation.95  The very different treatment of pregnant athletes makes for a clear-
cut case of pregnancy discrimination that is unlawful under the Title IX regulations.96   
The widespread and, until recently, unacknowledged discrimination against 
female athletes who become pregnant reflects the persistence of deeply ingrained, 
lingering beliefs about the incompatibility of sports participation with maternity.  
Reactions to female athletes who become pregnant are often driven by stereotyped 
notions regarding the level of physical activity that is appropriate for pregnant 
women and by a mindset that places pregnancy in a class by itself, viewing it as 
utterly incapacitating and incompatible with the status of an athlete in a way that 
                                                                
92See Michael Hiestand, ESPN Looks at Athletes Who Must Choose Pregnancy or a 
Scholarship, USA TODAY, May 11, 2007, at 3C (describing ESPN program examining the 
treatment of female athletes who become pregnant). 
93Outside the Lines: Pregnant Pause (ESPN television broadcast May 13, 2007). 
94See, e.g., Joanna Grossman, A New Lawsuit by a Female Athlete Tests Title IX’s 
Protection Against Pregnancy Discrimination, FINDLAW, May 6, 2003, 
http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/grossman/20030506.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2007) 
(describing a case filed by female athlete at Sacred Heart University alleging that the 
university denied her “medical redshirt” status and revoked her scholarship when she became 
pregnant); Amy Rainey, What Athletes Can Expect When They’re Expecting: Many Colleges 
Are Ill Prepared for Pregnant Athletes and Some Players Suffer as a Result, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (May 26, 2006), available at http://chronicle.com/weekly/v52/i38/38a04101.htm 
(describing several instances of alleged discrimination against pregnant athletes and the failure 
of universities to adopt policies protecting pregnant athletes); Melissa Silverstein, Pregnancy 
is Perilous for Female Basketball Stars, ALTERNET, June 13, 2006, 
http://alternet.org/story/37349/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2007) (discussing difficulties women 
basketball players face returning to the game after pregnancy).  For an excellent documentary 
film telling the story of a high school athlete who becomes pregnant, see THE HEART OF THE 
GAME (Woody Creek Productions 2005).  
95See 2006-07 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 15.3.2.2 Physical Condition of Student-
Athlete (2006) (“Financial aid awarded to a prospective student-athlete may not be conditioned 
on the recipient reporting in satisfactory physical condition.  If a student-athlete has been 
accepted for admission and awarded financial aid, the institution shall be committed for the 
term of the original award, even if the student-athlete’s physical condition prevents him or her 
from participating in intercollegiate athletics.”); id. at § 15.3.4.3 Reduction or Cancellation 
Not Permitted (“Institutional financial aid based in any degree on athletics ability may not be 
increased, decreased, or canceled during the period of its award…[b]ecause of an injury that 
prevents the recipient from participating in athletics.”). 
9634 C.F.R. § 106.40(b)(1)-(2), (5) (2000). 
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other temporary physical conditions and limitations are not.97  The failure, until 
recently, to question the exclusion of female athletes who become pregnant reflects 
the potency of the male model of athleticism, a model that is predicated on the norm 
of male bodies.   
Constraining ideologies of femininity, though greatly weakened by cultural shifts 
in recent decades, also continue to have power in suppressing and punishing female 
athleticism.  However, like the ideology of women’s maternal roles, such ideas 
operate covertly and are likely to be contested when exposed.  For example, the 
notorious Don Imus comment denigrating the Rutger’s women’s basketball team as a 
bunch of “nappy headed ho’s” generated widespread controversy and outrage 
precisely because it openly traded on older and (at least overly) discarded notions 
about female athletes having to prove their femininity.98  Imus’ slur against the 
Rutgers women drew on combined racism and sexism, as highlighted by his contrast 
with the women athletes on the opposing team, the University of Tennessee, who he 
said “look cute.”99   The femininity that Imus juxtaposed against female athleticism 
is an idealized white, middle to upper class femininity, apparently still reachable for 
athletes with straight, long hair in ponytails.   Hence, the Tennessee team was able to 
retain, in Imus’ comparison, a legitimating femininity that the Rutgers team could 
not.100  The Rutgers’ team’s femininity was compromised—they were “ho’s”—by 
their failure to temper their dominating athletic performance with the appropriate 
markers of an ideal, white, upper-class femininity.  Imus’ mentioning of their tattoos 
traded on specific class-based notions of ideal femininity, as his reference to the 
players’ “nappy head[s]” drew on racialized ideals of femininity unattainable by 
African-American women unable to conform to the light-skinned, straight-haired 
idealized version by which the athletes were measured.  
The Imus comment provoked a firestorm of criticism and a vehement defense of 
the honor and legitimacy of the Rutgers women, reflecting both a rejection of the old 
ideology and its continuing power.  This cultural lens was powerful enough that 
Vivian Stringer, the Rutgers’ coach, responded to the Imus comment from within the 
cultural box, reclaiming the femininity and cultural legitimacy of her athletes.  
Stringer defended her team, saying “They are young ladies of class, distinction. They 
are articulate.  They are gifted.  They are God’s representatives in every sense of the 
word.”101  Her response, rehabilitating her players as “ladies” and “articulate,” 
                                                                
97Cf. Women’s Sports Foundation, Issues Related to Pregnancy & Athletic Participation: 
The Foundation Position, http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues/disc/ 
article.html?record=1145 (last visited Sept. 26, 2007). 
98See David Carr, Networks Condemn Remarks By Imus, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 7, 
2007, at B-7. 
99See Rachel Blount, Selling sex & sports isn’t working: before Don Imus ever opened his 
foul mouth, two researchers were showing women’s sports gain nothing from marketing the 
athletes looks, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, MN), Apr. 17, 2007, at 1C. 
100Cf. Bill Ordine et al., Controversy Steals Shining Moment; Rutgers Team Voices Hurt; 
Imus’ Remarks Speak to Struggle Facing Female Athletes, BALT. SUN, April 11, 2007, at 1A 
(quoting one marketing executive as saying, “from a gender perspective, the Tennessee 
players should be as offended by Imus as the Rutgers players, because he pigeonholed them as 
‘pretty’ girls and didn’t mention their athleticism”). 
101Id. 
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reveals the ongoing power of the cultural conflict between sports and white, 
middle/upper class femininity, even as Stringer rejects its application to her team.102     
The overwhelmingly negative reaction to the Imus comment, and his ultimate 
ouster by the network, demonstrates the weakening of the older subordinating 
ideology that set up a stark conflict between sport and femininity.103  In this latest 
culture clash, the Rutgers players were in fact received as “ladies” of class and 
distinction, while Imus emerged as the cultural outcast.  Yet, the very power and 
injuriousness of the slur shows the resilience, at least covertly, of the ideology that 
leaves athletic women who do not adequately “prove” their femininity vulnerable to 
attack.   
Elite female athletes and powerful women in sport still face pressures to 
conspicuously assert their femininity and conform to dominant gender expectations.  
This pressure is evidenced by countless pictures in sports, including the common 
sight of women basketball coaches running the sidelines in high heels, professional 
women basketball players conspicuously and strategically talking to media about 
their husbands and children to dispel associations between the league and lesbianism, 
and the publication of pictures of elite female athletes turned out in feminine garb or 
sexy poses instead of the game-time, sweaty performance shots typical of male 
athletes.104   
The weakening of older constraining ideologies centered on maternity and 
femininity has been accompanied by the upsurge of updated ideologies focused on 
market-based explanations and assertions of differences, rather than inferiority, 
between men’s and women’s sports.  The current ideologies are less hidden and 
more potent in rebuffing women’s claims for equal funding and benefits.  These 
newer ideologies are more likely to be overtly invoked to defend a status quo that 
devalues women’ sports and resists demands for equality.105   
                                                                
102Id. (statement of a girl’s basketball coach reacting to the Imus controversy and 
explaining that the balancing act regarding athletics and femininity gets tiresome) (“Whenever 
we would go to away games…I had them [the female players] dress in a dress or nice pants, 
and I would too.  I wanted them looking feminine and not to be labeled.  I think women’s 
sports is always trying to live that down, and here it goes again.”); see also id. (statement of 
former Baltimore Colts linebacker, Stan White, whose daughter was a high-achieving athlete) 
(“It’s that old stereotype of women athletes who are good are really more like men.  They’re 
not feminine.”). 
103However, eight months after being fired by CBS Radio and MSNBC as a result of the 
Rutgers comments, Don Imus returned to broadcast radio.  See Paul Farhi, Don Imus Gingerly 
Steps Back on Air, WASH. POST, (Dec. 4, 2007), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/03/AR2007120300368.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2008). 
104Cf. Ordine, supra note 100 (stating one marketing executive who has worked with 
athletes said that female sports figures are still judged more by their sex appeal than their male 
counterparts). 
105See, e.g., Gary R. Roberts, Evaluating Gender Equity Within the Framework of 
Intercollegiate Athletics’ Conflicting Value Systems, 77 TUL. L. REV. 997 (2003) (following 
the market-based approach and arguing for the accommodation of the financial realities of 
institutions seeking to maximize football and men’s basketball revenues); JESSICA GAVORA, 
TILTING THE PLAYING FIELD: SCHOOLS, SPORTS, SEX AND TITLE IX 132-47 (2002) (arguing that 
gender differences in sports interests, not discrimination, explains women’s inequality in 
sports). 
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Like the shifting ideologies supporting gender inequality in sports, the practices 
of subordination are also moving targets.  The outright exclusion of women from 
sport has given way to a structure that gives women a substantial share of sports 
opportunities, but on a smaller scale and on different terms than men.  Half-court 
women’s basketball is long gone, but women’s sports are still a distant second in the 
resources and attention they receive.106  In both subtle and not-so-subtle ways, 
women’s sports are devalued in comparison to men’s sports.  The leadership 
structure of sports remains almost exclusively male and the dominant model of 
participation and competition was not selected for its fit with women’s lives.  The 
exploitation and abuse of women athletes by male athletes and male coaches, and the 
structuring of athletic programs to value elite competition over all else, often make 
the experience of playing sports less than empowering for women.  Challenges to 
women’s inequality in sports are frequently met with resistance, sometimes taking 
the form of leveling down men’s opportunities and resources in sports rather than 
increasing them for women.  As I have discussed elsewhere, the practice of leveling 
down replaces overt differential treatment with facially neutral treatment, without 
necessarily lessening the subordination of the discriminated-against group.107  As 
these examples show, and consistent with Siegel’s theory of “preservation through 
transformation,” the subordinating practices that reproduce and perpetuate women’s 
inequality in sports continue to evolve over time in response to cultural and legal 
challenges.  
Finally, an understanding of gender oppression in sports is further complicated 
by the reality that subordinating practices are not fixed and independent of the 
strategies that address them.  The existence of the double-bind gives subordination a 
shifting, see-saw like quality, tipping the magnitude of the problem in different 
directions depending on how it is addressed.  Much like the problem of pregnancy in 
the workplace, discussed above, efforts to secure gender equality in sport are 
complicated by the double-bind.  In a world where female athletes are devalued and 
marginalized, creating separate athletic teams for women risks adding to this 
marginalization and further subordinating women’s sports in relation to men’s sports 
(which, as noted previously, are tellingly referred to simply as “sports”).108  Yet, 
addressing women’s inequality through the creation of gender-neutral sports, and 
assimilating women into the existing programs designed for men, would risk the 
virtual exclusion of women from competitive sports, except for a token number of 
                                                                
106See CARPENTER & ACOSTA, supra note 77, at 177 (stating that, in 2002, females 
received only 36% of the operating budget dollars spent in intercollegiate programs). 
107See Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of 
Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2004). 
108See, e.g., Karen L. Tokarz, Separate But Unequal Educational Sports Programs: The 
Need for a New Theory of Equality, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 201, 239 (1985) (“[S]ex 
segregation in sports adversely affects women economically, socially, and politically.  It 
excludes women from power, fosters the myth of male supremacy, limits occupational choices 
for women, perpetuates the sex role stereotype of women as passive and weak, and invalidates 
the expressive/feminine aspect of sports.”); B. Glenn George, Fifty/Fifty: Ending Sex 
Segregation in School Sports, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107, 1145 (2002) (”This article proposes the 
elimination of [sex] segregation [in athletic programs]. Separate will almost never be equal, so 
eliminate separate.”). 
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elite female athletes.  Thus, a gender-neutral strategy also threatens to add to the 
marginalization of women as athletes.  A gender-blind approach would help only 
those women who are most “like” men in their athletic interests and abilities and 
who are able to succeed in a world of sport structured on men’s terms.   
Under the first approach, the gender-differentiation of sports and the marking of 
gendered teams operates to stigmatize and oppress women; but under the second, the 
gender-blind approach to equal opportunity also marginalizes and subordinates 
women.  Either strategy risks furthering women’s subordination in sports.  The very 
complexity of gender inequality involves multiple and cross-directional 
subordinating practices that are resilient and resist unitary solutions. 
While the above discussion is by no means a comprehensive analysis of the 
inequality that women experience in sports, it does suggest the slipperiness of 
subordinating practices and ideologies.  Gender inequality in sports is not produced 
by a single, one-dimensional practice with a coherent ideology.  Our legal theories 
need to be flexible and adaptable as well.  From a pragmatist’s perspective, 
consistency in legal theory is overrated, and we should focus our talents on crafting 
multiple, flexible strategies drawing on mid-level theories tailored to the practices 
and ideologies that are most harmful at any given time. 
IV.  TITLE IX’S PRAGMATIC FEMINISM 
Since subordination is multi-dimensional and constantly evolving, no one global 
theory of equality is sufficiently comprehensive to combat it.  Title IX’s more 
pragmatic mix and match approach to theory holds promise, and may be part of the 
reason why Title IX has had more success in escaping some of the pitfalls of other 
discrimination laws.  From the beginning, the sense that intercollegiate athletics was 
a “unique” setting for sex discrimination law allowed for room to experiment and 
depart from the typical formal equality approach that generally dominates sex 
discrimination laws.109  Instead of simply borrowing from Title VII’s approach to 
workplace discrimination, for example, the promulgation of the Title IX regulations 
and policies governing athletics involved a more reflective process of asking what 
works.110  More so than other discrimination laws, Title IX defies easy 
characterization in terms of its theoretical underpinnings, drawing from multiple 
theoretical frameworks. 
For example, some aspects of Title IX’s approach to sports correspond to liberal 
feminism and an equal treatment model, characterized by an approach that seeks 
equality on the same terms as men, to the extent that women are similarly situated to 
men.111  For example, Title IX’s equal treatment standard measures equal athletic 
opportunity by comparing the benefits accorded to male and female athletes.  Under 
                                                                
109See, e.g., Kelley v. Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1994) (“But Congress itself 
recognized that addressing discrimination in athletics presented a unique set of problems not 
raised in areas such as employment and academics.”). 
110See Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, Gender & Sports: Setting a Course for College 
Athletics: The Path of Most Resistance: The Long Road Toward Gender Equity in 
Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 51, 53-57 (1996) (documenting the 
history of the Title IX regulations and policy guidance). 
111See CHAMALLAS, supra note 18, at 35-38 (discussing liberal or “equality” feminism and 
its influence on law). 
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the equal treatment standard, educational institutions must provide equal treatment to 
female and male athletes with respect to a list of factors, including facilities, 
scheduling of games and practices, coaching, equipment and uniforms.112  This is an 
equal treatment/liberal feminist standard because it does not question the ways in 
which athletic sports programs are structured based on a male model, or the 
imbalance in the numbers of men and women who benefit from this model.  Instead, 
it defines equality in terms of the benefits accorded to those women who are  
similarly situated to men by virtue of their position as athletes. 
Likewise, equality with respect to athletic scholarships is also governed by an 
equal treatment/liberal feminist approach.  Female athletes are entitled to an equal 
opportunity to receive athletic scholarship awards, measured by a standard requiring 
proportionality in men’s and women’s scholarship awards compared to their 
respective sports participation levels.113  Under this standard, if women are forty 
percent of the school’s intercollegiate athletes, they should receive about forty 
percent of the school’s scholarship dollars.  This is a decidedly liberal feminist 
approach since it does not question the underlying male bias in the structure of sports 
(i.e., the greater numbers of men who participate) and only requires equality insofar 
as women are similarly situated to men by virtue of their status as varsity athletes.  
Like the equal treatment standard, this legal test permits any inequality to be fixed 
either by reducing the awards to male athletes or increasing the scholarship funds 
awarded to women, another feature of an equal treatment model.   
A third example of how Title IX incorporates a liberal feminist approach is in its 
limited guarantee of a right to try out for a place on a team in a sport offered only to 
the other sex.114  With one important exception, women who do not have access to a 
sport that is offered to men may try out for a place on the men’s team.  This is a 
classic formal equality approach, since only those women who can compete with 
men on men’s terms will benefit from a standard giving them an equal right to try 
out.  An exception to this right limits the reach of the equal treatment standard in this 
instance, rendering it a particularly anemic example of liberal feminism.  The equal 
try-out right applies only to non-contact sports, and contact sports are defined very 
broadly.115  Thus, the legal standard itself defines women and men as not similarly 
situated for the purposes of competing together in contact sports, a judgment that is 
premised on stereotyped notions about women’s vulnerability and need for 
protection.116  In that respect, the contact sports exception makes the right to try-out a 
very weak version of liberal feminism. 
The first two liberal feminist standards require group-based equal treatment (e.g., 
female athletes overall are entitled to equal benefits and scholarships compared to 
                                                                
11234 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2007). 
11334 C.F.R. § 106.37(c) (2007). 
11434 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2007). 
115Id. (defining contact sports to include “boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, 
basketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily contact”).. 
116For critiques of the contact sports exception, see Jamal Greene, Hands Off Policy: 
Equal Protection and the Contact Sports Exception of Title IX, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 133 
(2005); Suzanne Sangree, Title IX and the Contact Sports Exemption: Gender Stereotypes in a 
Civil Rights Statute, 32 CONN. L. REV. 381 (2000). 
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male athletes overall), while the third requires equal treatment on an individual level 
(an individual female athlete who is sufficiently talented may play on certain men’s 
teams).  Both the group-based and individual liberal feminist approaches are 
assimilationist in that they do not challenge the structure of sports, but seek to secure 
equal treatment for similarly situated women.   
One value of the liberal feminist approach is its power to contest overblown and 
subordinating notions of difference by asserting women’s similarity to men in 
deserving the same level of scholarship opportunities, sport benefits, and, to a lesser 
extent, the chance to try out for certain sports.117  The liberal feminist approach 
facilitates challenges to the ideology of gender difference by asserting the similarity 
of male and female athletes and the prominence of an athletic identity first and 
foremost, without regard to gender.  This approach has had some success in 
increasing the value placed on women’s sports and in creating more cultural space 
for female athleticism by celebrating elite female athletes.  Through claims of 
similarity and the celebration of elite female athletes, female athletes have come 
closer (although they still remain a distant second) to securing the privileges, status 
and esteem previously reserved for men in sports.  These changed cultural norms in 
turn have spurred the growth of women’s sports by encouraging more women to seek 
out athletic opportunity and benefit from competitive sports. 
A very different theory of equality is reflected in Title IX’s test for equal 
participation opportunities, the locus of the three-part test, the measure of Title IX 
compliance that has generated the most controversy.118  The underlying model for 
this part of Title IX is not liberal feminism, but a more substantive equality approach 
that seeks to accommodate and value women’s differences in sports.  The influence 
of the substantive equality/accommodation model is apparent in several ways.  First, 
the Title IX regulations presume and accommodate gender differences in athletic 
interests and abilities—without identifying the source or nature of the difference—by 
permitting athletic teams to be offered separately on the basis of sex if selection is 
based on competitive skill or the sport offered is a contact sport.119  Because 
intercollegiate and interscholastic programs nearly always select athletes on the basis 
of skill, separate men’s and women’s sports teams are the norm.  The implicit 
rationale is similar to an affirmative action rationale, justifying the gender-conscious 
treatment as a way of ensuring meaningful athletic opportunities for women. 
The second way in which the equal participation measure reflects substantive 
equality, and even a different voice approach, is in its refusal to require a mirror 
imaging of the men’s and women’s athletic programs.  Having allowed for sex-
separate teams, one approach to equality would be to require women and men to 
have identical sport offerings.  This would be more of a group-based equal treatment 
approach, requiring every sport offered for one sex to be offered to the other.  The 
risk of such an approach, of course, is that women’s sports programs would not serve 
women’s own sports interests as much as simply mirror the programs selected for 
and chosen by men.  Limiting women to the sports that men play does not 
                                                                
117The claim to similarity reflected in the equal try-out right, however, is weakened by the 
contact sports assumption, which elevates a rationale of gender difference. 
118For background on the development of the three-part test and its requirements, see 
Brake, supra note 3, at 46-49. 
11934 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2007). 
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necessarily meet women’s interests in sports if women prefer different sports.  
Instead of a rigid, formal equality approach premised on gender similarity, the Title 
IX regulations assume women may have different interests in sports than men, and 
therefore require schools to equally accommodate those interests.  Thus, women’s 
sports programs are supposed to include sports that reflect women’s interests, as the 
men’s offerings presumably reflect men’s interests.  This is akin to a “different 
voice” approach to equality, in which equality claims are premised on asserted 
gender difference (wherever it comes from) and the desired outcome is not just 
identical treatment but the equal valuing of women’s distinct perspectives.120 
The model for participation opportunities, then, is gender-conscious rather than 
gender-blind.  The advantage of such a gender-conscious approach is that it does not 
premise equal opportunity on women’s threshold similarity to men.  Instead, it 
searches for a measure of equality that acknowledges and values gender difference.   
It creates space for women’s sports to exist and develop without necessarily 
mirroring the opportunities selected for men.  The message of honoring and valuing 
gender difference in sports is somewhat at odds with the message underlying equal 
treatment claims, which assert that women are similar to men in relevant respects for 
the purpose of benefiting from sports.  Yet both messages hold truth and are valuable 
in asserting claims of gender equality. 
The different voice/substantive equality approach poses its own set of risks, 
however, primarily that by accommodating and emphasizing women’s difference in 
sports it will reinforce the marginalization and subordination of women in sports.121  
Much of women’s second class status in sports is predicated on an ideology of 
difference and the notion that women’s sports are not similar to men’s sports with 
respect to the criteria that go into valuing them, such as marketability and audience 
appeal.  Emphasizing gender difference in sports risks bolstering the notion that 
women’s sports are less valuable than men’s sports because they don’t match the 
athleticism, level of competition, or other qualities that generate audience interest in 
sports.  Especially to the extent that different voice approaches fail to identify the 
source of gender difference, the approach may reinforce notions that gender 
differences in sport are inherent and that the different valuations of men’s and 
women’s sports are natural and unproblematic.   
It is at this point that Title IX doctrine becomes quite interesting from a 
theoretical perspective.  The test for measuring Title IX compliance in participation 
opportunities within the context of sex-separate programs tempers these risks of the 
different voice approach by setting up a legal framework that critically examines the 
source of gender difference and holds institutions accountable for the ways in which 
they construct gender difference in some respects.  The three-part test for 
participation opportunities operates against the backdrop of sex-separate 
programming in which women’s and men’s sports offerings frequently diverge.  For 
Title IX to provide any real assurance of equal participation opportunity, some 
measure of equality had to be developed to ensure that a separate women’s sports 
program, unmoored from men’s programming, would offer women sufficient 
                                                                
120See CHAMALLAS, supra note 18, at 53-59 (describing different voice or cultural 
feminism). 
121Id. at 60-62 (discussing the dangers of cultural feminism). 
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opportunities in the sports they want to participate in.  The test developed for this 
purpose is the so-called three-part test for participation opportunities.   
Under this test, schools must comply with any one of three compliance measures 
by: (1) offering participation opportunities in numbers substantially proportionate to 
enrollment (for example, if women are fifty percent of the student body, they would 
have to represent roughly fifty percent of the school’s intercollegiate athletes); or (2) 
demonstrating a continuing history of program expansion that is responsive to the 
developing interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex; or (3) fully and 
effectively accommodating the interests and abilities of members of the 
underrepresented sex through the existing sport offerings.122  This test has been 
upheld by courts against many challenges arguing that it discriminates against men, 
who allegedly are more interested in sports and thus deserving of disproportionate 
opportunities compared to their enrollment.123  In rejecting such reverse 
discrimination challenges, courts have taken a critical approach to gender differences 
in sports interest, closely examining how educational institutions themselves 
construct sports interests through their disparate athletic offerings to men and 
women.124  The case law takes a decidedly social constructionist approach to gender 
difference, rejecting wholesale assertions that gender differences in sports interests 
are innate and justify offering a smaller share of opportunities to women.  
Title IX’s approach to ensuring women equal participation in sports thus departs 
from the typical liberal feminist approach in discrimination law, which requires the 
equal treatment of persons who are already similarly situated, by not tying the 
equality measure to a prior showing of women’s similar interest and ability in 
sports.125  It also departs from the different voice model which is generally agnostic 
toward the source of gender difference.  Instead of accepting gender differences in 
athletic interests as natural or even societal, the rationale behind the three-part test 
holds institutions accountable for their role in constructing, reinforcing and 
perpetuating gender differences in interests.  Applying this rationale, courts have 
refused to excuse gender imbalances in athletic opportunities based on gender 
differences in current interest levels.126  This critical approach to difference might be 
called structuralism or substantive equality with a critical approach to difference.  It 
is gender-conscious, focusing on equality of results instead of a formal equality of 
process, yet it is decidedly social constructionist (with a particular focus on the role 
of specific institutions rather than society in general) in its understanding of 
difference.  At its best, this approach avoids the pitfalls of liberal feminism, by 
                                                                
122This test comes from a 1979 Policy Interpretation adopted by the former Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare’s Office for Civil Rights (now located in the Department of 
Education). See SUSAN WARE, TITLE IX: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 75-76 (2007).  
123For a discussion of court decisions applying this test, see Brake, supra note 3, at 49-59. 
124Id. at 69-74. 
125For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 takes a liberal feminist approach 
to women’s equality at work which fails to account for the different situations of women 
workers with respect to care work. See Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment 
Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal 
Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 371 (2001),. 
126See Brake, supra note 3, at 49-59. 
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eschewing reliance on assertions of sameness to make an equality claim, and avoids 
the essentialism of the different voice/accommodation model by critically examining 
the source and implications of asserted difference. 
By working on multiple fronts simultaneously, with different theoretical 
approaches targeting different dimension of inequality, Title IX has had notable 
success in loosening the cultural norms that constrain and devalue female 
athleticism.  Because women are not shoehorned into programs designed for men, 
more women develop athletic interests, which both respond to and spur greater 
opportunities to play.  And because women athletes are promised baseline resources 
and benefits comparable to those given men (at least ideally, although this aspect of 
Title IX is clearly under-enforced), there are limits to and tools for fighting the 
marginalization and second-class status that often accompany activities that are 
feminized by assertions of gender difference.  Title IX’s amalgam of legal theory 
thus works simultaneously on the problems of marginalization (the exclusion of 
women from valued athletic opportunities) and cultural imperialism (the devaluation 
of female athleticism and the marking of female athletes as “other”), while creating 
opportunities for resisting the cultural norms that support all the faces of gender 
oppression in sports. 
However, Title IX’s success at navigating the double-bind that threatens to 
undermine efforts to address women’s exclusion from and marginalization in sports 
has not been matched by a comparable level of success in addressing the other faces 
of oppression.  For example, the exploitation of female athletes, in the form of the 
submergence of women into the existing commercialized and market-driven 
structure of sports, does not even register as a gender equality problem.  Title IX’s 
liberal feminist equal treatment standard takes the male model of commercialized 
sports as the baseline, without critically examining whether this model works well 
for women (or many men, for that matter).  By using elite male competitive sports as 
the baseline, Title IX privileges a model of sports that values winning and 
competitive standing over the joy of playing and the personal benefits of athleticism.  
Women’s teams that do not conform to that model of elite competition are not 
entitled to equal recognition or any space at all in an athletic program.   
A recent district court decision illustrates Title IX’s failure to challenge the 
model of elite competitive sports and the triumph of this model over a more 
educationally-oriented model of broad-based competition.  In this case, the plaintiff, 
a high school senior who had played volleyball on the school’s freshman and junior 
varsity teams tried out for, but did not make, the school’s varsity team.127  Because 
the school did not offer any non-varsity opportunities for seniors, and prohibited 
seniors from playing on the sub-varsity teams, the student alleged that she had an 
unmet interest in playing volleyball.128 She alleged that many female students tried 
out for and were cut from the varsity volleyball team, and that the boys’ varsity 
teams did not make any cuts.129  She argued that the school denied her equal athletic 
treatment and failed to accommodate the unmet interest of girls under the three-part 
test by rejecting a request by her and her teammates to add a fourth (non-varsity) 
                                                                
127Wieker v. Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist., No. 05-cv-806-WYD-CBS, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11956 (D. Colo. 2007). 
128Id. at *2-3. 
129Id. at *22. 
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volleyball team.130  She lost both claims because no such non-varsity opportunities 
were provided for male seniors.131  Although the school district failed to provide 
athletic opportunities to female students substantially proportionate to enrollment, 
and also failed to comply under prong two of the three-part test, the court found in 
favor of the school under prong three of the test.132  The court granted summary 
judgment to the school district, finding that even if there was enough unmet interest 
in girls’ volleyball to field an additional team, the plaintiff failed to show that a 
sufficient number of the female students who were cut had the ability to play on a 
competitive interscholastic volleyball team.133   
The court’s decision is unremarkable in its application of existing law under the 
three-part test, which has been a vehicle for adding women’s teams at a comparable 
competitive level as the men’s teams, typically requiring schools to add more varsity 
sports for women to more closely match the number of varsity opportunities 
available to men.  Yet the decision clearly illustrates Title IX’s implicit incorporation 
of elite competitive sports as the baseline measure of equality.  Title IX has not been 
a vehicle for interrogating how well the elite model of commercialized sport works 
for women (or men, for that matter), nor for examining the exploitation and 
commodification of athletes that occurs under that model.  Many of the benefits of 
sports, including improved physical fitness, socialization opportunities and 
leadership development might be better promoted by a more inclusive model of 
sports that values widespread participation and enjoyment in sports over elite 
competition.  The different voice model of equality has made no inroads in nudging 
the hyper-competitive model of sports in the direction of a model of sports that 
places a higher value on broadly inclusive participation, learning new skills, 
cooperative teamwork, and the joy of playing. 
The commercialization of college and university sports, which sets the stage for 
the commodification and exploitation of athletes, has also been impervious to 
pressure from Title IX.  Any hopes that an equal treatment standard might “break the 
bank,” ushering in a more reasonable approach to athletic expenditures if they had to 
be matched for women, have not been realized.  Expenditures on men’s “major” 
sports continue to climb through the roof, escalating at shocking rates.134   At most, 
Title IX has served as a tool to increase the resources allocated to women’s most 
elite sports, although such resources have still fallen far short of those allocated to 
men.135  Title IX’s equal treatment standard has not been fully enforced to provide 
actual equality of treatment to comparable numbers of elite male and female athletes, 
and it is not clear that, even if it were, this would be the best course for women or for 
the place of sports in universities more generally.  A bigger dose of different voice 
                                                                
130Id. at *11-14. 
131Id. at *11-12, *26-27. 
132Id. at *15-19. 
133Id. at *26. 
134See, e.g., Deborah Brake, Revisiting Title IX’s Feminist Legacy: Moving Beyond the 
Three-Part Test, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 453, 469-70 (2004). 
135See CARPENTER & ACOSTA, supra note 77, at 177 (stating that for every one new dollar 
spent on women’s sports since 1972, two new dollars have been spent on men’s sports). 
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feminism might be useful to confront the problem of exploitation by questioning the 
dominant elite model of sports in favor of an approach to sport that would value 
participation for its educational value, rather than for its marketability.  
Gender oppression in the form of powerlessness has also been untouched by Title 
IX.  Title IX, along with other discrimination laws such as Title VII and the Equal 
Pay Act, takes a gender-neutral approach to employment discrimination against 
female coaches and administrators that has been utterly anemic in challenging the 
power structure of intercollegiate athletics.136  In fact, Title IX may even have 
contributed to the decline of women in coaching positions that has coincided with the 
law’s tenure, to the extent that it has made positions coaching women athletes more 
attractive to men by boosting the resources channeled into women’s sports.137  Title 
IX, like Title VII, suffers in this area for its blind reliance on gender-neutrality, 
refusing to view the dearth of women in coaching positions as an equality problem as 
long as the criteria for obtaining powerful positions are themselves gender-neutral.  
The gender-blind approach ignores the many ways gender shapes sports 
opportunities.  A more gender conscious approach that considered the opportunities 
for female athletes to have female role models, mentors and leaders in sports might 
enable Title IX to have more of an impact in this area.  The dearth of women in sport 
leadership positions only strengthens the cultural connections between sport and 
masculinity, and further contributes to the institutional construction of gender 
differences in sports.   
Finally, Title IX has been very weak in responding to gender-linked violence and 
abuse of female athletes.  The abuse of female athletes by predominantly male 
coaches and athletes is a pernicious form of gender oppression in sports.138  It limits 
the potential of sports to empower women and acts out a distinctly male form of 
athletic privilege.  Title IX responds with a very weak version of dominance 
feminism.  Unlike liberal feminism and substantive equality/different voice 
feminism, dominance feminism is not concerned with examining and responding to 
sex difference, but focuses on raw power as a source of gender inequality.139  
Dominance feminism is particularly concerned with sexual subordination and the 
privileging of a virulent hetero-masculinity that subordinates women and 
nonconforming males.140   
                                                                
136See Brake, supra note 3, at 84, 128-32, for an explanation and critique of how these 
laws apply to women coaches of women’s teams. See also Brake, supra note 134, at 459-66. 
137See CARPENTER & ACOSTA, supra note 77, at 173-74 (explaining the decline in women 
holding coaching positions following the enactment of Title IX). 
138See Nancy Hogshead-Makar & Sheldon Elliot Steinbach, Intercollegiate Athletics’ 
Unique Environments for Sexual Harassment Claims: Balancing the Realties of Athletics with 
Preventing Potential Claims, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 173, 173-79 (2003) (stating 
that,“[a]lthough concrete statistics on sexual harassment in women’s sports are minimal, one 
comprehensive study on the issue reported that one-fifth of female athletes in Canada have 
been sexually harassed or abused by their coaches,” and discussing the particular 
characteristics of competitive sports that create special opportunities for the harassment and 
abuse of female athletes). 
139See Chamallas, supra note 18, at 45-50. 
140See id, at 45. 
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Although Title IX draws on dominance feminism to recognize sexual harassment 
and abuse of female athletes as a form of gender discrimination, it stops far short of 
providing a meaningful remedy.  Title IX’s legal standard in this area is even weaker 
than that under Title VII, both in terms of the standard for institutional liability and 
the threshold for determining when sexually subordinating conduct rises to the level 
of actionable harassment.  While Title VII draws on agency principles to set the 
contours of employer liability for sexual harassment, Title IX incorporates a direct 
liability standard for educational institutions.141  The Title IX standard requires proof 
of actual notice of the harassment to a person in a position of authority who responds 
with deliberate indifference.142  Courts have construed this standard strictly, such that 
the liability rules for educational institutions are much more lenient toward schools 
and universities than they are toward employers.143   
In addition, the severity and frequency of the conduct required to establish a 
claim are much tougher under Title IX than under Title VII.  Only conduct that is 
severe, pervasive and objectively so bad as to effectively deny educational benefits 
will violate Title IX.144  Like the standard for institutional liability, courts have 
applied this test strictly.145  Much harassing conduct that limits the athletic 
experience of female students and acts out hetero-male privilege by male coaches 
                                                                
141Compare Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (Title VII), and 
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (Title VII), with Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (Title IX), and Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 
U.S. 629 (1999) (Title IX). 
142See Gebser, 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (teacher-student harassment); Davis, 526 U.S. 629 
(1999) (student-to-student harassment). 
143See, e.g., Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Schs.,2006 FED App. 0426P (6th Cir.) 
(stating that notice of coaches’ improper sexual behavior toward another student was not 
notice of the hostile environment he created for the plaintiff); Shaposhnikov v. Pacifica Sch. 
Dist., No. 04-01288, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18330 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2006) (holding that 
school’s ineffectual response to severe, daily harassment of plaintiff did not satisfy deliberate 
indifference standard because not clearly unreasonable).  See also Catherine Fisk & Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Vicarious Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983 and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 755 (1999) (criticizing the lower level of protection from sexual harassment 
provided by Title IX’s institutional liability rules compared to Title VII); Deborah L. Rhode, 
SEX IN SCHOOLS: WHO’S MINDING THE ADULTS? DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 
290, 297 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) (criticizing Title IX’s more 
difficult liability standard for harassment claims). 
144See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (requiring conduct to be "so severe, pervasive, and 
objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational 
opportunities or benefits provided by the school." 
145See, e.g., Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 911, 915-18 (S.D. Ohio 1998), 
aff’d, 263 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2001) (dismissing Title IX sexual harassment claim as not 
sufficiently severe or pervasive where female athlete who refused coach’s sexual advances 
was denied the opportunity to train with the team).  Notably, however, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, recently reversed a panel’s decision that a coach’s verbal 
sexual harassment of a female athlete was insufficiently severe or pervasive to state a Title IX 
claim for a sexually hostile environment.  See Jennings v. Univ. of North Carolina, 444 F.3d 
255 (4th Cir. 2006), affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by 482 F.3d 686 (4th Cir. 
2007) (en banc). 
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and athletes falls far short of the bar set by courts.  For example, one court ruled that 
verbal taunts directed at a female high school basketball player, which included 
calling her a “lesbian whore,” did not amount to actionable harassment because the 
student did not actually quit the basketball team, even though she testified that the 
harassment made staying on the team “hell” and that she considered quitting.146   
For Title IX to have any traction in addressing the gender violence and abuse that 
affects female athletes, its incorporation of the dominance feminism model must be 
strengthened.  Sports will never be an institution equally open to women as long as it 
remains a place that teaches and protects a virulent hyper-masculinity that 
subordinates women. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Title IX has had its greatest success in addressing the problems of 
marginalization and cultural imperialism—precisely the areas where the law’s 
theoretical underpinnings are most eclectic and creative, in keeping with the spirit of 
pragmatism.  Even here, however, Title IX has fallen far short of total success in 
eradicating these forms of gender oppression.  To some extent, the feminist agenda 
behind Title IX is hindered by one of the risks of pragmatism: a tendency toward 
complacency in relying on “common sense” instead of critical analysis in 
envisioning and achieving a just result.  Joseph Singer has warned of the danger of 
complacent pragmatism in the form of raw compromise that lets uncritical “common 
sense” shape one’s determination of a just result.  As an example, Professor Singer 
criticizes Justice O’Connor’s pragmatism for succumbing to this flaw, and argues 
that “common sense” often implicitly privileges a more powerful perspective over 
alternative ones.147  He cautions that “freedom from theory-guilt” should not mean an 
abdication of the responsibility to acknowledge and critically examine the value 
choices behind our decisions.148  
The contact sports exception is one example of a complacent pragmatism, 
reflecting an uncritical acceptance of “common sense” understandings that women 
need protection from physical contact with men in sports.  While purporting to be 
based on the practical realities of gender difference, the contact sports exception 
incorporates a male perspective on sports that views women as unfit to compete with 
men in physically strenuous activities.  It is incompatible even with the liberal 
feminism underpinnings of Title IX’s equal treatment standard, and especially so 
                                                                
146Drews v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 393, No. CV04-388-N-EJL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
29600 (D. Idaho May 11, 2006). 
147See Joseph William Singer, Comment, Property and Coercion in Federal Indian Law: 
The Conflict Between Critical and Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1821, 1830  
(1990) (observing that “[c]ommon sense is likely to embody the perspective of majority or 
dominant groups in society,” and criticizing reliance on common sense that is blind to the 
dominant perspective’s “complicity in an existing power structure”). 
148Id. at 1830-31 (“Freedom from theory-guilt may mean the recognition that we must take 
responsibility for the judgments we make, rather than pretending that those judgments can be 
made for us by applying a determinate and comprehensive theory of justice. But it may also 
mean the failure to reflect on and acknowledge the actual value choices implicated in those 
judgments.  The former is an aspect of pragmatism generally, while the latter reflects the 
unattractive aspects of complacent pragmatism.”). 
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with the critical approach to difference in the structuralism behind the three-part 
test.149  To the extent it is related to different voice feminism, it greatly distorts it by 
denigrating rather than valuing women’s athleticism.  It smacks of raw political 
compromise rather than a reflective response to gender oppression in sports.150 
Another example of complacent pragmatism is the Department of Education’s 
Office for Civil Rights 2005 policy clarification interpreting prong three of the three-
part test to permit educational institutions to demonstrate full and effective 
accommodation through the use of survey instruments measuring the athletic 
interests of female students.151  Under the agency’s interpretation, a university may 
survey its female students through email surveys, treating the failure to respond as 
proof of lack of interest, thereby demonstrating that the institution is already fully 
meeting its female students’ interests in playing sports.152  As Erin Buzuvis has 
explained, the survey method of compliance fails to acknowledge the core theory 
behind the three-part test, that athletic interest is driven by and dependent upon the 
opportunities provided.153  The 2005 survey represents a retreat to “common sense” 
notions that girls and women are less interested in sports, rather than critically 
examining the social context of how interest develops. 
No one approach to legal theory can solve the thorny problems of gender 
oppression, the double-bind, and the threat of backlash.  Despite the risks of 
complacency in uncritically examining dominant “common sense” perspectives, 
pragmatism is a promising approach for feminist scholars, with its reminder to be 
vigilant in tailoring strategies to the full context of oppression and to treat legal 
theory as a work in progress, while relentlessly attending to changes in the social 
context.  Rather than picking a theoretical approach for its consistency and abstract 
purity, feminist scholars should treat legal theory as contingent and context-specific, 
while continually evaluating it for how it serves our feminist agendas.154  Title IX’s 
                                                                
149See Jamal Greene, Hands Off Policy: Equal Protection and the Contact Sports 
Exemption of Title IX, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 133 (2005) (critiquing the contact sports 
exception as incompatible with liberal feminism); Brake, supra note 3, at 139-43 (critiquing 
the contact sports exception as incompatible with the structuralist approach of the three-part 
test). 
150Cf. Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 270 n.5 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Congress would indeed 
be surprised to learn that Title IX mandated co-ed football teams.”). 
151Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Additional Clarification of Intercollegiate 
Athletic Policy: Three-Part Test—Part Three 1-13 (2005), available at http://www.ed.gov/ 
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/title9guidanceadditional.pdf.   
152Id.  
153See Erin E. Buzuvis, Survey Says…A Critical Analysis of the New Title IX Policy and a 
Proposal for Reform, 91 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2006). 
154Cf. Ruth Anna Putnam, Comment, Justice in Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1797, 1809 
(1990) (“‘Failure to recognize that general rules and principles are working hypotheses, 
needing to be constantly tested by the way in which they work out in application to concrete 
situations, explains the otherwise paradoxical fact that the slogans of liberalism of one period 
often become the bulwarks of reaction in a subsequent era.’”) (quoting John Dewey, Logical 
Method and Law, 10 Cornell L.Q. 17 (1924), reprinted in 15 THE MIDDLE WORKS 1889-1924 
68 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1983)). 
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mix and match approach to theory provides an interesting model of how a pragmatic 
feminism might work—albeit, an imperfect one. 
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